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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574  
JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–556 v. 
RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, ET AL.;  
VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–
562 v. BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, 
ET AL.;  
APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–571 v. 
RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL.; AND  
GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14–574 v. STEVE BESHEAR, 
GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY  
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT [June	26,	2015]	
 
FRANKE, J., CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT 
 
I join parts I through VI of Court’s opinion, concurring in the 
judgment.  I agree that the decision of the court below should be reversed, 
and therefore I concur in the Court’s judgment, but write separately to clarify 
that this matter should not be decided on fundamental rights grounds.  
Further, I believe that the Court should provide more specific instructions to 
the court below with respect to the appropriate remedy that should be 
awarded in light of the equal protection remedy we find herein: the only 
remedy that would be equality-enhancing overall would be one that 
disestablished the institution of civil marriage altogether.  It would then be 
left to the states to devise a more equitable means by which to secure the 
economic and legal interests of its citizens; one that does not rest on status 
hierarchies that run afoul of fundamental values of equality and democracy. 
 
We are urged by the petitioners in this case to usher in the next step in 
the modernization of the institution of civil marriage.  The petitioners, 
sixteen people making up eight couples, contend that any distinction between 
their partnerships and those now deemed eligible to marry in the states in 
which they reside, turns on the consideration of factors rendered 
constitutionally illegitimate for the purpose of public law-making.  This 
argument takes two principal forms: one based in the Equal Protection 
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Clause, and another that suggests a substantive due process right to civil 
marriage as a fundamental right.  
 
I. 
 
 As a preliminary matter, I note that the relief sought by the petitioners 
herein is neither radical nor sweeping, notwithstanding the alarm bells rung 
by some amici.  The claimants merely plea that their unions should be 
legitimized through the grant of a civil marriage license on the same terms as 
that afforded to different-sex couples. They insist that the same level of 
commitment, decency, and stability reasonably characterizes their 
partnerships as do the partnerships of different-sex couples that are granted 
state licensure.  Indeed, the facts alleged by the couples in the petitioner 
class suggest a greater degree of commitment and stability than the majority 
of different-sex couples who are not barred from a civil license for their union.  
In important respects, the success of the petitioners in this case will subsidize 
the underlying values of marriage more generally, insofar as the petitioner-
couples have embraced values of monogamy, financial interdependence, 
loving and responsible parenthood, and dignity that make up the very fabric 
of traditional notions of marriage.  To the ways in which dignity underwrites 
the celebrated status that marriage enjoys I shall return.  The petitioners 
herein have no aspirations to upend the institution of marriage, but rather 
seek to prove their entitlement to the blessings, rights, and responsibilities 
conferred by civil marriage on its current terms. 
 
II. 
 
 The Court’s and the nation’s evolving sense of justice, protected in 
many cases through a constitutional commitment to equality, has assigned 
particular legal and social opprobrium to public policies or laws that manifest 
or perpetuate ideologies of superiority and attendant inferiority.  As the 
CHIEF JUSTICE rightly notes, “Legislation must promote the public 
interest, and may not be used merely to promote or disparage the private 
interests of some group.”1 A mere desire to stigmatize or humiliate a 
particular group cannot serve as a legitimate public justification for 
lawmaking or public policy.  See Windsor v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2675 
(2013); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(concurring opinions); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 
534 (1973). 
 
																																																								
1 Opinion for the Court at p. 2. 
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This Court has a rich jurisprudence elaborating more than one way of 
framing the guarantee of equality.  One approach, preferred by the CHIEF 
JUSTICE, analogizes the instant case to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 
144, 152 & n.4 (1938), and sets out to determining whether sexual 
orientation-based discrimination should be granted suspect class status akin 
to race.   Some scholars have described this as an “anticlassification” 
approach and have critiqued it for the way in which it distracts the equality 
analysis from underlying causes or effects of status hierarchies by focusing 
attention instead on the wrong of legislative classification as a failure of 
instrumental rationality. Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination And 
Anticlassification Values In Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1470, 1503 (2004).   
 
Yet another account interprets the values underlying the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equality guarantee as hostile to status hierarchies.  This 
perspective toward constitutional equality seeks to isolate and excise from 
the domain of legitimate public action those “laws and practices that 
aggravate [or perpetuate] the subordinate position of a specially 
disadvantaged group.” Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 108, 157 (1976).  This approach, often described as a 
“group disadvantaging” principle, is vulnerable, however, to a critique that it 
relies too heavily on social facts of disadvantage and their aggravation, 
rather than the exposure of the logic underlying the regulation, a logic with a 
basic structure of inferiority and superiority.   
 
A separate line of cases treats the constitutional promise of equality as 
something more ambitious and more substantive.  In these cases the Court 
has accepted the invitation to identify and then dismantle the ideologies or 
forms of thinking that maintain status hierarchies.  The Court’s infelicitous 
evaluation of laws that single out a kind of status for negative legal 
treatment has roots outside the context of the Equal Protection Clause.  For 
instance, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), we held that rights 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment are in jeopardy when a mere status, 
drug addition in that context, forms the basis of criminal punishment: 
 
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt 
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, 
or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine that 
the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and 
other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, 
involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in the light 
of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal 
offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be 
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an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
370 U.S. at 666. 
 
In cases raising sex discrimination claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause brought to this Court in the last 40 years, we have repudiated the 
embrace from an earlier era of the sex-based status hierarchy that lay at the 
core of the separate spheres doctrine endorsed by the Court in Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). See Reed v. Reed,	404 US 71 (1971); 
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
 
In the context of race-based equality the Court most unequivocally 
adopted the antisubordination principle, calling out forms of power that 
created and reinforced the formation of caste when it was mobilized through 
invidious classification.  For instance, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 
(1967), the Court invalidated laws that prohibited white persons from 
marrying non-white persons because, inter alia, such laws were “measures 
designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Similarly, an ideology of racial 
supremacy underwrote the essential wrong of laws segregating people on the 
basis of their race in the context of public transportation, employment, 
housing, or access to lunch counters. See e.g. Beckett v. School Bd. of City of 
Norfolk, 308 F.Supp. 1274, 1304 (E.D. Va. 1969) rev’d on other grounds, 434 
F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1970)(attributing some forms of housing segregation “as 
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”).  This approach 
embodied the most effective repudiation of Chief Justice TANEY’s 
endorsement of racial caste in Dred Scott v. Sanford:  
 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, 
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the 
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 
 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 343, 407 (1857). 
 
This approach runs far deeper than a mere condemnation of racial 
classifications, irrationality in the making of public policy, or violations of a 
formalistic commitment to color-blindness.  Rather, our constitution’s 
commitment to equality should, and does, take aim at a particular form of 
mischief beyond mere classification.  A commitment to the equal protection of 
the laws entails a suspicion with regard to the work that classification does 
and the ways it collaborates with ideologies of supremacy through the notions 
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of inferiority it puts into action.  In this regard, the principle of inequality 
that animates some of the Court’s modern equality jurisprudence concerns 
itself especially with state policies and practices that create or legitimize a 
badge of inferiority born by racial and other minorities.  This badge operates 
invidiously as a kind of warrant permitting, if not inviting, exclusion of, 
derision toward, and second-class treatment of those subjects so insigned.  
Under this account, when applied to the context of racial equality, the 
Fourteenth Amendment embodies “a broad principle of practical equality for 
the Negro race, inconsistent with any device that in fact relegates the Negro 
race to a position of inferiority.”  Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 429-30 (1960). 
 
The commitment underlying the equal protection clause in the racial 
context, one that aims to invalidate public policies that enact or perpetuate 
ideologies of inferiority, is equally salient in the case before us now.  The 
segregation of same-sex couples from the domain of civil marriage offends 
fundamental principles of equality because these laws express and 
implement an ideology of disgust, disdain, and antipathy towards lesbian and 
gay people that renders same-sex partnerships categorically undeserving of 
the recognition conferred on different-sex couples as a class.  The N.A.A.C.P. 
Legal Defense and Education Fund made a similar argument to this Court in 
their briefing of the Loving v. Virginia case: “Actually, the laws against 
interracial marriage grew out of the system of slavery and were based on race 
prejudices and notions of Negro inferiority used to justify slavery, and later 
segregation … [These laws] intrude a racist dogma into the private and 
personal relationship of marriage.”  Brief of N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Loving v. Commonwealth of 
Virginia, 1967 WL 113929 at 13, 14-15. 
 
With particular relevance to the instant case, in a series of decisions 
the Court has drawn sexual orientation-based discrimination within the 
protective pickets of the Equal Protection Clause by framing the claimants’ 
equality claims as status-based injuries.  Starting with Romer v. Evens, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996), the Court has developed a jurisprudence of equality for 
lesbian and gay people that identifies a status-based harm as the gravamen 
of the constitutional wrong.  “[Amendment 2] is a status-based classification 
of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection 
Clause does not permit.” 517 U.S. 620 at 635.  “Respect for this principle 
explains why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal 
status or general hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall 
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from 
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most 
literal sense.” Id. at 633.  At stake in this reading of the Equal Protection 
Clause is the notion that status hierarchies undermine, indeed are anathema 
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to, the very essence of democracy.  “A State cannot so deem a class of persons 
a stranger to its laws,” clarified Justice KENNEDY.  Id. at 635.  See also Jack 
Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997).   
 
The Court continued this line of reasoning in United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. __ , 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), wherein we invalidated a statute that 
denied federal legal recognition to valid marriages between persons of the 
same-sex by anchoring our Equal Protection analysis in the observation that, 
“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to 
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter 
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the 
States.”  133 S.Ct. at 2693. 
 
Overall, this line of cases can be understood to embrace something 
more than an anticlassification principle of equality, preferring instead a 
stance that can be understood as antisubordination in nature.  See Siegal, 
supra, at 1505.  Given that the Court’s prior lesbian and gay equality cases 
drew from an antisubordination account of equality I expect us to continue 
that line of reasoning in the case before us now. 
 
The antisubordination approach affords the Court the opportunity, or 
better yet, requires that the Court unearth and expose the social meanings 
expressed by the prohibition, and obliges the Court to describe “the status 
relations enforced, and the status harms inflicted, by the prohibition” in 
question.” Siegal, supra, at 1503.  I prefer to approach the wrong raised by 
the petitioners herein by recognizing how laws that ban civil licensure to 
otherwise qualified same-sex couples convey a badge of inferiority toward 
those couples on account of their homosexuality. In so doing, those laws 
reinforce the caste supremacy of heterosexuality over homosexuality.   
 
The ban on same-sex marriage is best understood as a measure 
designed to maintain heterosexual supremacy and to inflict a badge of 
inferiority on sexual minorities generally, and lesbians and gay men 
particularly.  This argument can be found in judicial findings and briefs as 
the cause of marriage equality has moved its way toward us in lower courts, 
likening the invidious wrong underlying the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the institution of civil marriage to the kind of ideological wrong named 
by this Court in Loving. See e.g.: Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 268 
(Ct.App.Md. 2007); In Re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757, 834 (Cal. S.Ct. 
2008).  The plaintiffs in the 2001 Massachusetts challenge to the state’s ban 
on same-sex civil marriage argued in the trial court: the ban on same-sex 
marriage “reinforces a caste supremacy of heterosexuality over 
homosexuality just as laws banning marriages across the color line exhibited 
and reinforced white supremacy.” Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, No. 01–
1647-A, Massachusetts Superior Court, Aug. 20, 2001. Similarly, Judge 
Vaughn Walker, ruling in the case challenging California’s ban on same-sex 
marriage enacted in Proposition 8, found that the marriage ban “conveys a 
message of inferiority.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Pretrial Proceedings and 
Trial Evidence Credibility Determinations Findings of Fact Conclusions of 
Law Order, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 974, 980 (N.D.Cal. 2010).  
 
To be clear, the ideology of inferiority that underwrites the laws under 
challenge in this action is not reserved for same-sex couples that seek to 
marry.  Rather, it enunciates a kind of hatred or disgust of lesbian and gay 
men generally, whether or not they are in intimate partnerships or seek to 
have those partnerships licensed by law.  The ban on marriage for same-sex 
couples is simply one institutional setting in which that ideology of disdain 
gains the state’s endorsement.  As our prior jurisprudence makes clear, the 
embrace of this kind of subordinating dogma cannot serve as a legitimate 
public justification for lawmaking or public policy.  See Windsor v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985) (concurring opinions).  
I concur in the CHIEF JUSTICE’s conclusion that laws categorically 
barring otherwise qualified same-sex couples from eligibility for civil 
marriage licenses are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but I do not join his reasoning in so finding.  I see no 
need to examine the question of whether sexual-orientation based 
classifications should receive the same elevated level of constitutional 
scrutiny as classifications based on race, sex or other suspect or quasi-suspect 
classes.  Rather, in this case we can conclude that same-sex couples can 
successfully challenge on equal protection grounds laws that categorically bar 
them from civil marriage because such laws find their origin in and 
perpetuate notions of heterosexual supremacy, designs that cannot form the 
basis of a legitimate public purpose.  
 
 
II. 
 
As the CHIEF JUSTICE notes in Part VII of his opinion, petitioners 
also argue that a ban on same-sex marriage violates a fundamental right to 
marry, secured by the Due Process Clause.  I do not join in the Court’s 
fundamental rights analysis, first because I regard it as dicta given that the 
Court had found sufficient grounds to invalidate the challenged laws on equal 
protection grounds.  Second, I part company with what I regard as slippage in 
the CHIEF JUSTICE’s reasoning with respect to the fundamental nature of 
civil marriage.  Noting first that “we need not decide whether the states have 
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a constitutional duty to create a special legal status called marriage”2 the 
CHIEF JUSTICE then goes on to treat civil marriage “as if” it were 
fundamental, building on stilts an argument with no foundation.  The CHIEF 
JUSTICE begins with a premise that transforms a contingent fact, “[a]ll of 
the states have created such a status,” into a necessary one, all states must 
do so because “[w]e therefore treat it as a fundamental interest.”  The 
question before us is not whether marriage is fundamental in a religious, 
cultural, or historical sense but only whether the state’s civil licensure of 
marriage is fundamental in a sense that is constitutional in nature.  Without 
denying the clear fact that many people consider marriage to be a distinctly 
meaningful, if not sacred, form of intimate association that may entail the 
blessings of clergy, family, and community, this Court has never held that the 
constitution’s due process protections require that the state set up a civil 
marriage regime to license those otherwise private vows.3 
 
As this Court has acknowledged, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003), but 
this important constitutional principle imagines that liberty flourishes in the 
absence of, not because of, state regulation, and does not require the state’s 
involvement in sanctioning or licensing the forms that a good, meaningful or 
sacred life might take.4  Unlike political rights such as voting, many of which 
require the state’s facilitation in order for them to be meaningful, state 
facilitation is in no way essential to the revered nature of private, intimate 
vows of love and commitment.  As is the case generally with the U.S. 																																																								
2 Opinion for the Court at p. 10. 
3 Cases cited by the petitioners and amici advancing the proposition that 
there is a Due Process right to civil marriage are less conclusive than they 
claim. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  These cases, taken as a whole, 
do not establish a substantive due process right to civil licensure of marriage 
in the absence of the illegitimate exclusion of one class of persons therefrom.    4	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	aren’t	other	contexts	where	state	facilitation	is	essential	to	the	fundamental	right	at	issue.		In	Maher	v.	Roe,	432	U.S.	464	(1977),	the	Court	rejected	the	claim	of	indigent	women	that	the	meaningful	exercise	of	fundamental	rights	secured	in	Roe	v.	Wade,	410	U.S.	113	(1973),	entailed	assess	to	public	funding	that	would	render	those	rights	accessible	for	poor	women.			I	believe	that	Maher	was	wrongly	decided,	yet	my	view	in	this	case	does	not	contract	my	position	in	Maher.		In	the	case	of	poor	women’s	access	to	abortion,	facilitation	by	the	state	in	the	form	of	public	funding	is	the	only	way	to	render	the	right	secured	in	Roe	meaningful.		In	the	absence	of	public	funding,	the	right	secured	in	Roe	would		be	completely	meaningless	for	many	poor	or	low	income	women.		With	marriage,	by	contrast,	state	facilitation	or	licensure	is	incidental	to	a	vow	of	love	and	commitment	that	is	essentially	private	in	nature.		
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Constitution, civil liberties and rights tend to be negative in nature, 
proscribing certain discriminatory or oppressive terms and conditions 
imposed by the state on its citizens.  It might be a better constitution if it 
contained an array of positive in addition to negative rights	but	it	would	be	a	markedly	different	one	from	the	one	we	have.5 
 
To be sure, once the state gets into the marriage business it must do so 
on terms that conform to the requirements of the constitution, but this strong 
imperative does not entail a constitutional duty placed on the state to license 
marriages at all.6  For this reason, I would resist using this case as an 
opportunity expand the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause to 
include a fundamental right to marry. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, while I join the Court’s finding that the Equal Protection 
Clause is offended by laws that limit the issuance of civil marriage licenses to 
different-sex couples, I write separately to clarify our instructions to lower 
courts on remand with respect to the remedy entailed by the constitutional 
violation we find today. 
 
Given that I would ground the Court’s holding in an equal protection 
injury that focuses on the way the law reinforces the caste-based supremacy 
of heterosexuality, the appropriate remedy for such a violation must pay heed 
to the larger rights and interests of the full class of persons so harmed.  As 
such, the real parties in interest in this matter include homosexuals more 
generally, not merely homosexuals who seek to marry, or same-sex couples 
who seek to marry.  Reverse engineering the ban on same-sex civil marriage 
leads one back to a blueprint for homophobia more generally, and the 
marriage ban is merely one element of that originary design. 
 
The interests of this larger class of persons should inform our 
consideration of the appropriate remedy in this case.  Justice would not be 																																																								5	See	Pamela	S.	Karlan,	Let's	Call	The	Whole	Thing	Off:	Can	States	Abolish	The	
Institution	Of	Marriage?,	98	Cal.	L.	Rev.	697,	700	(2010).	
6 “The ‘right to marry,’ is different from rights deemed ‘fundamental’ for 
equal protection and due process purposes because the State could, in theory, 
abolish all civil marriage while it cannot, for example, abolish all private 
property rights.” Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 
325 n. 14 (Mass SJC 2003)(citations omitted).  See also: Cass Sunstein, The 
Right to Marry, 26 Cardozo L.Rev. 2081, 2083–2084, (the right to marry 
“comprises a right of access to the expressive and material benefits that the 
state affords to the institution of marriage ... [and that] states may abolish 
marriage without offending the Constitution.”) (italics omitted). 
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done, nor would the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause be honored, if in 
dismantling one status hierarchy we inextricably fortified another.  Yet we 
would do just that were we to simply order a remedy that same-sex couples 
be permitted to gain civil marriage licenses on the same terms and conditions 
as different-sex couples.  This remedy would simultaneously dissolve one 
status hierarchy within the gay community while assembling another, 
privileging married gay people over unmarried gay people, and would 
reinforce the supremacy of married people as a class.7  
 
As society evolves in such a way as to recognize the claims of lesbians 
and gay men to equality and dignity, marriage has persisted as the social, 
legal and moral container for legitimacy and respectability.  Surely the Court 
is correct in finding that the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples from 
civil marriage creates the kind of stigmatic harm that the Equal Protection 
Clause was designed to prohibit.  But in so finding we should be loath to 
reinforce the legacy of laws and public values that disparage sexual relations 
outside of marriage.  The dignity enjoyed by same-sex couples who are now 
eligible to marry should not be gained by reinforcing the stigma suffered by 
adults who cannot or do not marry, or by children born to married parents.8  
The cause of advancing the equal protection rights of same-sex couples should 
not be bought at the expense of an equality norm that condemns marital 
status discrimination.  As one commentator has rightly noted, “[i]n a world in 
which marriage is both a privileged status and a status of the privileged, 
marriage equality that rests upon non-marriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing 
the many other status inequalities that taint the legacy of marital 
supremacy.”  Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy And The Constitution Of 
The Nonmarital Family, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (2015). 
 																																																								
7 We have witnessed the amplification of this status hierarchy in several 
states that have extended marriage rights to same-sex couples legislatively, 
through state court litigation, or through popular referendum.  In 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and 
Vermont, extending civil marriage rights to same-sex couples was 
accompanied by the statutory dissolution of other forms of family recognition 
such as domestic partnerships or civil unions. See National Center for 
Lesbian Rights, Summary of Laws Regarding Recognition of Relationships of 
Same-Sex Couples, December 10, 2015, available at:  
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Relationship_Recognition_State_Laws_Summary.pd
f.  In these states marriage is granted a monopoly on licensing largely out of 
concerns for distributional efficiency.   
8 See e.g. Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, And 
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (2011). 
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 For these reasons, the appropriate remedy for the Equal Protection 
injury in this case would be the disestablishment of civil marriage altogether.   
 
 This remedy may strike some as a radical cure for the ill of excluding 
same-sex couples from civil marriage.  To be sure, the disestablishment of 
civil marriage could impose its own equal protection injury if doing so were 
motivated by a desire to deny same-sex couples a right to marry, just as 
closing public schools created an equal protection injury when done to avoid 
this Court’s command to end de jure racial segregation in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):  “[w]hatever nonracial grounds might 
support a State’s allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must 
be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation 
do not qualify as constitutional.” Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 377 U.S. 
218, 231 (1964). But if the abolition of marriage were undertaken, as I urge 
here, in sympathy with the equal protection rights of same-sex couples no 
constitutional infirmity of the sort of the kind confronted by the Court in 
Griffin would occur.  Rather than a subterfuge to avoid compliance with the 
constitution, the abolition of marriage would assure greater fidelity to the 
constitution’s promises of equal treatment and dignity under law for all gay 
men and lesbians.9 
 
IV. 
 
 For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the laws at 
issue here violate the Equal Protection Clause, but I do so for reasons other 
than those marshaled by the CHIEF JUSTICE.  Laws barring same-sex 
couples from eligibility for licensure as civil marriages find their origin in and 
perpetuate notions of heterosexual supremacy, and have the aim and effect of 
imposing a badge of inferiority on gay men and lesbians more generally.  
Furthermore, I seek to clarify the nature of the remedy that ought to be 
ordered on remand.  Given that the real parties in interest in this action 
include all gay men and lesbians, the underlying values of equal protection 
can only be served if the Court were to avoid a remedy that ameliorated one 
form of inequality while simultaneously exacerbating yet another.  For this 																																																								9	Constitutional	scholars	have	described	the	cynical	elimination	of	public	benefits	or	rights	that	is	motivated	by	a	larger	interest	in	rights-avoidance	as	a	kind	of	“leveling-down,”	whereas	the	remedy	demanded	by	the	petitioners	herein	requires	a	kind	of	“leveling	up,”	the	provision	of	a	benefit	to	a	previously	excluded	group.		See	Pamela	S.	Karlan,	Race,	Rights,	and	Remedies	in	Criminal	Adjudication,	96	Mich.	L.	Rev.	2001,	2027-29	(1998).		The	remedy	I	suggest	herein	does	not	amount	to	a	form	of	“leveling	down”	insofar	as	the	remedy	seeks	to	advance	the	equal	protection	rights	of	all	members	of	the	larger	class	with	interests	in	this	matter:	gay	men	and	lesbians	who	suffer	a	status	injury	regardless	of	their	marital	status	or	desire	to	formalize	an	intimate	relationship.	
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reason, the only remedy that would be equality-enhancing overall would be 
one that disestablished the institution of civil marriage altogether.  It would 
then be left to the states to devise a more equitable means by which to secure 
the economic and legal interests of its citizens; one that does not rest on 
status hierarchies that run afoul of fundamental values of equality and 
democracy. 
 1 
Comments on Obergefell Opinion 
Katherine Franke 
I joined Chief Justice Balkin’s opinion because I, like he, believe that state laws 
that bar otherwise eligible same-sex couples from receiving civil marriage licenses 
violate equal protection principles.  But I chose to describe the equality injury somewhat 
differently than he did. 
 Of course, the road to gaining marriage equality for same-sex couples could have 
been achieve via a number of different routes.  The Supreme Court’s approach in 
Obergefell frames the issue as one that primarily implicates the liberty interests of the 
petitioner-couples. In Lawrence, Windsor, and now Obergefell Justice Kennedy has been 
the primary architect of a jurisprudence of liberty for lesbian and gay people. While I am 
usually a big fan of liberty, Justice Kennedy’s version of liberty is too, well, liturgical for 
my taste.  The way in which he weaves a concept of liberty in these cases into a larger 
theology of human dignity often times troubles me.  It is the dignity of the bourgeois, 
monogamous, respectable couple (a counterfactual premise in Lawrence, to be sure) that 
has been unfairly humiliated by the state in Windsor and seeks the state’s blessing with a 
civil marriage license in Obergefell. 
 By leveraging the “sweet mysteries of life” language of Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”1), Justice Kennedy 
announced an autonomy/liberty right of lesbian and gay people in Lawrence to be free 
from criminal sanction (for sex that is between adults, consented to, and in private); in 
Windsor to have their valid civil marriages recognized by the federal government; and in 
Obergefell to enjoy the nobility, dignity and/or unique fulfillment of entering a marriage, 
a universal human good arising from the most basic human needs and essential to our 
most profound hopes and aspirations.2  
 Liberty got the job done of securing a constitutional norm protecting the rights of 
(some) lesbian and gay people, but it did so in a way that lodged that norm in the value of 
individual freedom.  Thus the wrong that was remedied in these cases was one of 
irrational, or even unfair, constraint on human action and agency.  Necessary to 
Kennedy’s reasoning was a celebration of the normative worlds from which lesbian and 
gay people had been shut out: the dignified couple (Lawrence), preferential economic and 
                                                
1 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 851 (1992)). 
2 These notions began Justice Kennedy’s analysis of the constitutional question in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). 
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legal status (Windsor), and the transcendent dignity and security of having the state 
license one’s marriage. 
 Lost in the liberty analysis, however, is a sustained analysis of the origins of the 
legal prohibitions or penalties challenged in these cases.  I have always admired the 
reasoning in Loving v. Virginia for Chief Justice Warren’s and Justice Stewart’s 
willingness to call out Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law as “obviously an endorsement 
of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”3  Not a problem of mere classification, not a 
problem of “not treating like things alike,” not a failure of “color-blindness,” but an 
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.  Bam! 
 Only the use of a substantive equal protection analysis in Obergefell could isolate, 
name, and condemn the underlying ideology of supremacy that barred same-sex couples 
from civil marriage.  This kind of constitutional inquiry would gain the right to marry for 
the plaintiffs in this case, but would do so in a way that would deliver a more 
generalizable rule that could be exported to other contexts where heterosexual 
supremacy, or heterosexism, does its nasty work, and may indeed benefit future racial 
and sexual equality cases.  The gay rights movement has made good use of the 
jurisprudence of racial and sexual equality as it fought for marriage equality, and I aimed 
to devise a rule in Obergefell that would return the favor – strengthening the Court’s 
equal protection reasoning in such a way that would be useful in other settings.  Marriage 
is merely one context where heterosexual supremacy is sutured into law and culture, and 
I felt strongly that a win in Obergefell should not be on terms that cabined it in that 
particular context. 
 For this reason I turned to an antisubordination equality principle in my opinion.  
Reva Siegel has elegantly parsed the differences between anticlassification and 
antisubordination approaches to the Equal Protection Clause,4 and this distinction 
characterizes my motivation to write separately from Chief Justice Balkin in this case.   
 The additional virtues of an antisubordination approach, one that invests in an 
anti-caste principle that aims to dismantle a status hierarchy, is that it avoids any 
particular investment in the institution of civil marriage.  When the Supreme Court found 
that the City of Greenville, South Carolina’s law mandating the racial segregation of 
                                                
3 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).  Justice Stewart’s concurrence echoed the 
Chief Justice, “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white 
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, 
as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Id. at 11. 
4 Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination And Anticlassification Values In 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1472-73 (2004). 
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lunch counters5 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
found no need to discuss the importance of lunch counters in the nation’s culinary 
traditions or history.  Rather, the Court focused on the racism that was entrenched in local 
law.6   
 Given that I maintain a rather critical posture toward the institution of marriage 
itself, and toward a gay rights movement strategy that elevated marriage rights to the top 
of a civil rights agenda,7 I wanted to craft an opinion in Obergefell that would be more 
about the evils of homophobic or heterosexism than it was about virtues of marriage.  I 
aimed to do that in three ways.  First, as already discussed, I relied on an 
antisubordination approach to equality.  Second, I framed the stakes in the case as 
implicating not just same-sex couples who sought to marry, but all lesbian and gay 
people, a class that can be understood as the objects and negative beneficiaries of laws 
and cultural norms that embrace heterosexual supremacy.  Third, I affirmatively rejected 
any finding that there was a substantive due process right to marriage or that marriage 
was, by implication, a fundamental right.  
 Throughout all of the opinion I was careful to avoid arguments favored by Justice 
Kennedy (and deployed to a lesser degree by Chief Justice Balkin) that celebrate the 
dignity of the married couple.  These arguments, in my view, purchase inclusion of same-
sex couples in the institution of marriage by disparaging life on marriage’s outside or 
outside the conjugal couple, and have had the unfortunate effect of off-loading stigma 
previously associated with gay families onto other non-normative families.  It was 
important to me to find a path for the plaintiffs to win that avoided an investment in 
marriage itself.  
 Finally, my opinion sought to make clear that this case was about the civil 
licensure of marriages, not the institution of marriage itself.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court in Obergefell collapsed these two notions of marriage, and did so to great 
doctrinal and political expense.  The institution of marriage as a religious bond, or one 
that bound kinship units together through contract for daughters/wives preexisted the 
state getting into the game by issuing civil marriage licenses.  Mary Anne Case reminds 
us that when the Crown first began to license marriages, “a marriage license could be 
                                                
5 “It shall be unlawful for any person owning, managing or controlling any hotel, 
restaurant, cafe, eating house, boarding-house or similar establishment to furnish meals to 
white persons and colored persons in the same room, or at the same table, or at the same 
counter.”  Code of Greenville, 1953, as amended in 1958, § 31-8. 
6 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
7 These critiques are elaborated in Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality (NYU 
Press 2015); Longing for Loving, 76 Ford. L.Rev. 2685 (2008); The Politics of Same-Sex 
Marriage Politics, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 236 (2006) and The Domesticated Liberty 
of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 Colum.L.Rev. (2004). 
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seen to have functioned [] in ways loosely analogous to a modern dog license, as 
something like a certificate of ownership of the wife, entitling the husband to her 
property, her body and its products, including the labor she engaged in for wages and the 
labor that produced offspring.”8   As such, the state’s entry into the marriage licensing 
business is relatively recent, and its motivations for doing so were rather questionable 
from the perspective of equality.  
On balance, there is no good reason, to my mind, why the state is so deeply 
involved in sanctioning certain kinship or conjugal partnerships and not others.  In 
Obergefell Justice Kennedy regrettably reaffirmed rather noxious language from 
Maynard v. Hill, “Marriage, the Maynard Court said, has long been “‘a great public 
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.’” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. at 
2601, quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 213 (1888).  He then concluded, citing 
historian Nancy Cott, that “[m]arriage remains a building block of our national 
community.”  Id.  If this is true, it is so not as a matter of natural fact but as a 
consequence of the legal and economic privilege we grant to the institution itself.  I see 
no justification, based in equality or otherwise, why the gay rights movement should 
collaborate in the normalization of the unfortunate social reality that grants married 
people a kind of status-based privilege not enjoyed by others who form partnerships or 
family outside marriage or whose lives don’t take a marital or couple form at all. 
For these reasons my opinion concludes by making a plea for the disestablishment 
of the institution of marriage altogether.  It strikes me as tragic that the constitutional 
legibility of lesbians and gay men would be accomplished within a frame that not only 
takes for granted, but actually fortifies, another form of status hierarchy, one that 
privileges married people over unmarried people.  Particularly given that I identify the 
larger class of all gay men and lesbians as the real parties in interest in this case, I lament 
a resolution of the case that “levels up” the plaintiff class (couples who would be eligible 
for civil licensure but for the “same-sex” nature of their union) and confers on them the 
privileges of membership in a superior class while leaving members of the lesbian and 
gay community who do not desire or are ineligible for such status without the benefits of 
these newly-gained constitutional protections.   
                                                
8 Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1767-68 (2005). 
